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BY VICTOR S. YARROS
RECENT developments in science, notably physics and astron-
omy, have led, most naturally, to new attempts at effecting a
reconciliation between religion and exact science. We have been
assured by many that the majority of the modern physicists are
Idealists, not Materialists or Mechanists, and that science has ac-
quired a new humility by reason of the universal abandonment of
the old conception of matter. We have been assured—by Gilbert
Chesterton among others—that Agnosticism, Rationalism and Dis-
belief have run their course and are fading away, making room for
a revival of religion and faith.
What more logical and comprehensible, then, than a new effort to
establish an entente cordiale between Science and Religion?
In this paper we shall examine the contribution to that effort of
Prof. Julian S. Huxley, grandson of the great Professor Thomas
H. Huxley, in The Atlantic Monthly for March. As the editor
of the magazine remarks, this contribution is the more interesting
and significant because of the difference between its spirit and tenor
and those of the contribution of the grandfather to the same sub-
ject in another era and another intellectual atmosphere.
"Religion Meets Science" is the title of the paper we are about to
consider and comment upon. For the most part, the paper is admir-
able and thoroughly sound. It dwells on the adjustments religion
has to make in the light of modern astronomy, modern physics,
modern cosmology. The notions expressed in the Old and New
Testaments are too dead to deserve even passing references. We
have new views of the world, of space and time, of evolution and
dissolution. We cannot indulge anthropomorphic fancies. We can-
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not talk seriously about Jesus sitting at the right hand of God. We
cannot talk of heaven as a place somewhere in space. We cannot
talk of prayer and miraculous intervention in response to prayer.
All this, we see. is naive and childish, and w^e must put away all
puerile ideas about God, the next world, individual immortality.
But if we do put these things away, do we not also put away re-
ligion ?
No, answers Prof. Huxley. Science may destroy certain theolo-
gies, even certain rigid and unprogressive religions, but it cannot de-
stroy religion, which "is the outcome of the religious spirit, and the
religious spirit is just as much a property of human nature as is
the scientific spirit".
These words obviorsly call for a definition of the term religion
and the phrase religious spirit. Prof. Huxley, aware of this, fur-
nishes the definitions, but in a rather indirect and distinctly unsatis-
factory way.
"The practical task of religion," he says, "is to help man to live
and to decide how he shall use the knowledge and the jjower science
gives him". Again : "\\'hat religion can do is to set up a scale
of values for conduct and to provide emotional or spiritual driving
force to help in getting them realized in practice".
Science, reasons Prof. Huxley, is morally and emotionally neu-
tral. It has no scale of valves, apart from the value of truth and
Inowledge, which of course it emphasizes and upholds. What we
are to do with facts, ideas, opportunities supplied by science, it is
the duty and privilege of religion to determine.
This is oerfectly clear, if not at all new. But let us glance at
Prof. Huxley's assumptions. Science, he premises, is morally neu-
tral and has no scale of values, aside from the value of truth and
knowlc^dge. But to what sciences does this generalization refer?
Physics has no scale of values. Astronomy and chemistry are moral-
ly neutral. So are several other sciences we call natural or physical.
But is it a fact that ethics, economics and politics are morally and
emotionally neutral sciences? Is history neutral and sans a scale of
values? Is sociology?
The answer assuredly is that today no progressive thinker will ad-
mit for a moment that the social sciences are neutral morallv and
emotionally. Prof. Huxley is sadly behind the times.
Take the science of economics. Since Adam Smith it has been
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held that economics has its scale of values and is morally quite par-
tisan. Its business is to promote the material welfare of nations,
to do away with unmerited poverty, unjust inec[uality, lack of fair
opportunity. It is bound to point the way to economic justice and
to permanent general prosperity. It has principles, postulates, ob-
jectives, ideals. Its exponents are not neutral, cold, objective. They
take sides ; they attack ; they defend ; they fight for what they consi-
der the right solutions of problems.
Now, men of science who fight and work for objectives possess
driving force. They do not have to borrow it.
What is true of economists is true of ethicists, sociologists,
workers in political science. They severally have their respective
ideals and standards-—scales of values. They fight for these. Hence
they are not morally neutral. What becomes of Prof. Huxley's
whole argument if his major premise is false—as it is?
True, he may rejoin that the militant men of science just referred
to are also religious, and that it is religion, not science, that fur-
nished the driving force they display and apply. But that plea would
beg the whole question. If science has scales of values, it does not
require any aid from religion. And science is merely descriptive if
it does not set goals and predict results. The social sciences have
long since ceased to be merely descriptive. Any knowledge of econ-
omics, politics, ethics, sociology as taught for a century or more
leaves no doubt upon the point.
It is sufficient to mention srch names as Mill, Spencer, Toynbee,
Comte, George, Ward, Proudhon, Hobson, Keynes, Dewey, Taw-
ney. And one hardly needs adding that the radicals among the
economists, sociologists and ethicists have never failed to stress the
moral and human aspects of their sciences. Indeed, Prof. Huxley's
own grandfather, who wrote much on political, social and ethical
questions, even though they were not strictly within his special pro-
vince, and who was a militant Agnostic, was never morallv neutral
or indiiTerent to social and spiritual values.
So much for facts. Dealing with the matter theoreticallv, is it
not absurd to suppose that the social sciences could dispense with
scales of values, with standards and ideals? Science is based on
experience and observation. The human race has lived on our globe
long enough to have discovered that societies, economic systems,
political organizations cannot possibly exist without codes of con-
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duct, principles of co-operation, restraints upon instinct and appetite.
Science formulates and explains these codes, rules and standards.
Laws, in truth worthy of the name are discovered, not arbitrarily
enacted. They grow out of conditions and necessity. Religion has
nothing whatever to do with them.
To quote George Santayana, "the principle of morality is natural-
istic. Call it humanism or not, only a morality frankly relative to
man's nature is worthy of man".
If all theologies and religions were abandoned tomorrow^ morality
and hence ethical science and ethical philosophy would remain.
Morality changes with conditions and circumstances, precisely be-
cause it is human and relative to human needs under the dictates of
association and co-operation, as of competition and permissible con-
flict.
Thus Prof. Huxley's basic assumption collapses under inquiry.
Religion is not necessary to morality.
It is not necessary, either, to the arts and to the appreciation or
cultivation of beauty. Religion has sought the aid of art and l^eauty,
and for good utilitarian reasons. But the sense of beauty is natural
to man. as it is in some degree to the lower animals, and would be
cultivated and fostered in societies devoid of all religious institu-
tions or ideas.
We are brought back, however, to the question : What essentially
is religion? Can it be completely shed and renounced? Since Prof.
Huxley does not help much in our search of adequate definitions
and clear ideas, let us turn to Prof. Nathaniel Schmidt of Cornell
University and his book on "The Coming Religion". According to
him, religion is "devotion to the highest"—the highest truth, the
highest duty, the highest beauty. Science, Prof. Schmidt holds,
agreeing in this matter with Prof. Huxley, seeks knowleedge for
its own sake, without regard to its applications or effects, and by
purelv intellectual processes. Religion, like science, seeks knowl-
edge and truth, but it seeks these in the realm of what is felt, de-
sired and conceived as the highest good".
Now, there is no serious objection to giving the name Religion to
the sentiment of devotion to the highest, but it is plain that this is
an arbitrary proceeding. It does no grave harm, but no good, either.
It would seem to be more sensible and more scientific to call senti-
ments and emotions by their own names. If I long for the highest
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in music— for Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, say— I do so because this
music gives me the deepest and keenest pleasure. It exalts and stirs
me, and I like to feel exalted and moved. But why call this state of
mind religious, and what do we gain by so calling it? We only
confuse issues by so doing. If, again, I want to know the highest
truth attainable in regard to my duty to others, or to society, I
consult the best ethical teachers and guides. I may wish to be just,
but the sentiment of justice is not enough—definite ideas and con-
cepts of justice are necessary to right conduct. Prof Schmidt talks
of one's feelings, but feelings are not always right. And even when
right, they need interpretation and direction.
Prof. Schmidt falls into the same error as Prof. Huxley in assert-
ing that the processes of science are purely and strictly intellectual,
and, therefore, science is not interested in applications or effects.
The sciences that have to do with human welfare and human pro-
gress are decidedly interested in applications and effects, and the
workers in these sciences, as we have seen, are not incapable or
ashamed of emotion when they enforce a truth or oppose a fallacy
or falsehood.
We must conclude that religion cannot rationally lay claim to a
monopoly of devotion to the highest good. Men not in the least re-
ligious are devoted to the highest good, and this because they are
human and all things human are natural to them.
Let me try to offer a different definition of religion. It is a name
for one's attitude toward the unknown, the mysterious, the unknow-
able, possibly. Contemplation of space, time, space-time, the stuff
of the universe, the evolution and dissolution of the manifold forms
that stuff" has assumed and is assuming including what we call life
and mind, fills one with wonder and awe. After all, science solves no
ultimate problem. It does not pretend to be able to do so. It ob-
serves, classifies, generalizes, theorizes, verifies, modifies its theories
and finally formulates so called laws. But it has its limits, and has
no hope of transcending them.
The emotions aroused by contemplation of the great, unfathom-
able mysteries may be called religious emotions. That begs no
question. But we must recognize that those emotions are unaccom-
panied by definite ideas. We marvel, we sigh, we ask questions,
but no answer comes. Religion remains emotional. The explana-
tions offered by the theologies are crude, inadequate, or even mean-
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ingless. We have outgrown all the theologies. We have reached
Agnosticism, and there we stick.
It is, therefore, neither necessary nor possible to reconcile science
and religion. There is, in truth, no conflict. Religion is an emotion,
and it is common to all human beings. Science cannot get rid of
it, and does not desire to get rid of it. It is, moreover, an ennobling
emotion. It engenders humility and modesty. It makes for better
science and better conduct.
But when, in the name of religion, some theologian essays a
theory of cosmic evolution, of life and destiny, science immediately
steps in and simply asks for the evidence. Feelings are facts ; the-
ories are prepositions to be demonstrated. No religion now pro-
fessed, no theology now expounded, is able to demonstrate its propo-
sitions. It :s preposterous to ask us to accept mere propositions on
faith. Why should we? How can we and remain reasonable be-
ings? Suppose some one claims to have had a revelation. The
claim itself implies a theory that has. to be proved. A revelation
from whom? By what sign do we distinguish revelations? Are
they real or imaginary? The prophets who have claimed revelations
had preconceived notions to control their thinking. They had naive
ideas of psychology and of the nature of evidence. Those ideas
today provoke a smile, and yet we are expected to adhere to the-
ologies and religious systems based on those primitive and puerile
ideas
!
We refuse to abdicate and stultify ourselves. We insist on study-
ing religious beliefs and institutions scientifically, and when we do
this, we are apt to conclude that religion is an emotion and nothing
else, and an emotion compatible with Agnosticism. The Agnostic
knows where science stops, but he also knows that emotions are not
ideas, and that intellectual honesty and clear, sincere thinking are
indispensable to all genuine human progress.
